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Although commonly used, the term memory strength is not well defined in humans. Besides durability, it has been conceptualized by
retrieval characteristics, such as subjective confidence associated with retrieval, or objectively, by the amount of information accurately
retrieved. Behaviorally, thesemeasures are not necessarily correlated, indicating that distinct neural processesmayunderlie them. Thus,
we aimed at disentangling neural activity at encoding associated with either a subsequent subjective sense of memory strength or with a
subsequent objective amount of information remembered. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), participants were
scanned while incidentally encoding a series of photographs of complex scenes. The next day, they underwent two memory tests,
quantifying memory strength either subjectively (confidence on remembering the gist of a scene) or objectively (the number of details
accurately remembered within a scene). Correlations between these measurements were mutually partialed out in subsequent memory
analyses of fMRI data. Results revealed that activation in left ventral–lateral prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction predicted
subsequent confidence ratings. In contrast, parahippocampal and hippocampal activity predicted the number of details remembered.
Our findings suggest that memory strength may reflect a functionally heterogeneous set of (at least two) phenomena. One phenomenon
appears related to prefrontal and temporoparietal top-down modulations, resulting in the subjective sense of memory strength that is
potentially based on gist memory. The other phenomenon is likely related to medial–temporal binding processes, determining the
amount of information accurately encoded intomemory. Thus, our study dissociated two distinct phenomena that are usually described
as memory strength.
Introduction
Strong memories are often characterized as those memories that
remain stable, while time or interference eliminates weak mem-
ories. Beside this durability concept, memory strength has also
been conceptualized by retrieval characteristics (Ebbinghaus,
1885; Schacter, 2001). For instance, a strong memory can be de-
fined as a memory that is retrieved with high subjective confi-
dence, or objectively, with a high amount of information
accurately remembered. Behaviorally, however, such subjective
and objective measures are not necessarily correlated with each
other (Tulving, 1981; Schacter, 1995; Kensinger, 2008), suggest-
ing that they may rely on distinct neural processes and partly
different representations.
Several well documented phenomena of memory distortions
indicate that the dissociation between these subjective and objec-
tive measures is relevant. High confidence of introspective expe-
rience, for instance, is not always veridical, as in cases of
eyewitness misidentification or illusory memory (Loftus, 1979;
Schacter, 1995). One explanation for this is that subjective con-
fidence may rely on processes related to remembering the gist of
an episode, whereas objectivity of memories is based onmemory
formation for specific details. Converging evidence from neuro-
psychological and functional neuroimaging studies on memory
distortions suggest distinct neural correlates associated with false
and true memories. Particularly, studies on gist-based false rec-
ognitionmemory suggest that a frontal–parietal network appears
related to the subjective sense of remembrance in absence of
veridicality (Schacter et al., 1996; Cabeza et al., 2001; Kim and
Cabeza, 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007). In contrast, activation
in the medial temporal lobe (MTL), specifically the parahip-
pocampal cortex, is associated with the successful encoding and
retrieval of true memories (Cabeza et al., 2001; Kao et al., 2005;
Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Squire et al., 2007), indicating an asso-
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ciation with objective veridicality of memories. These studies
probing neural correlates of false and true memory, however, do
not address the question of whether neural operations at encod-
ing distinguish between subsequent memories characterized ei-
ther by subjective sense of remembrance or objective amount of
information remembered.
We therefore developed a paradigm that allowed us to disso-
ciate memory encoding-related neural activity associated with
memory strength based on either a subjective or an objective
measure. During event-related fMRI, participants learned inci-
dentally a series of photographs of complex scenes. Two different
memory tests were completed 1 d later. In one test, participants
rated the subjective confidence with which they remembered
having seen photographs corresponding with one-sentence writ-
ten gist descriptions. In a second test, participants were required
to distinguish three true from three false details of each scene.
Importantly, because these twomeasures are likely correlated, we
orthogonalized both measures with respect to each other before
entering them as trial-based parametric modulations in subse-
quent memory analyses of fMRI data. This allowed us to identify
and dissociate neural activity associated with either subjective or
objective measures of memory strength. Drawing on previous
findings of distinct neural signatures of false and true memories,
we expected that prefrontal activity would predict memory
strength based on subjectivemeasures (confidence of remember-
ing the gist), and that MTL activity would predict memory
strength based on objective measures (number of details accu-
rately remembered).
Materials andMethods
Participants. Twenty-two young, healthy, male volunteers (aged 19–36
years; mean SD, 22.7 4.01 years) with normal (or corrected) vision
participated in this study. Participants were healthy and reported no
history of neurological or psychiatric disease. Participants gave written
informed consent in accordance with the requirements of the local insti-
tutional review board (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen) and the declaration of
Helsinki. Data of two participants were excluded from further analysis:
one due to poormemory performance (hit rate at chance level of 0.5) and
the other one due to excessive headmovement during scanning (4mm
within one run).
Stimuli. Initially, we carefully selected 200 color photographs of scenes
depicting distinct meaningful activities related to either humans or
animals from a commercially available image database (http://www.
shutterstock.com/). For each picture, we created a sentence of 5–10
words describing the central meaning (“gist”) of the scene on the basis of
the following two criteria (Adolphs et al., 2001, 2005): first, the sentence
should be sufficient to identify the photograph and to distinguish it from
the other scenes. Second, the sentence should not include any peripheral
detail. Another identically structured set of sentences (based on different
photographs that were not used in this study) was created as lures for the
memory test.Moreover, for thememory test on details, eight details were
identified in each picture. For each detail, we made both a true and an
adapted false (but equally plausible) detail, resulting in eight pairs of true
and false details for each picture. These eight pairs per picture were
obtained from a separate pilot study, in which 10 additional participants
rated the likelihood that these true and false details would occur in a
scene described by the one-sentence description, butwithout having seen
the actual photographs of the scenes. The difference of likelihood ratings
between true and false details was calculated for each pair and across
participants. Only true and false details whose likelihood ratings did not
differ significantly ( p  0.05) were used for the actual experiment (see
Table 1 for an example). Written gist descriptions of pictures that were
rated as unclear descriptions by any participant were furthermore ex-
cluded. The final stimulus set used for the fMRI experiment consisted of
150 scenes (plus 10 extra scenes for the training set) with one-sentence
gist descriptions and six pairs of true and false details. Luminance of all
selected pictures was equalized.
Procedure and tasks. The experiment consisted of a study phase on the
first day (day 1) and two memory tests on the consecutive day (day 2)
(Fig. 1). During the study phase, participants were scanned while per-
forming an incidental encoding task on 150 sequentially and centrally
presented photographs (presentation time: 6 s, mean intertrial interval,
6 s, randomly varying between 3 and 9 s in steps of 1 s). Participants were
instructed to imagine themselves being in the scene as vividly as possible,
and to make a judgment of how much they would like to be present in
that scene on a four-point scale (i.e., 1, would like it very much; 2, would
like it; 3, would not like it; 4, would not like it at all). To ensure that
participants did not expect any subsequent memory tests, they were told
that they participated in a study onmental imagery.Moreover, they were
informed that their eye movements would be recorded using an eye
tracker. The study phase was divided into three runs of 50 trials each.
Within each run, 10 null events of 6 s duration were pseudorandomly
intermixed to minimize potential effects of expectation and optimize
contrast-to-noise ratio of event-related fMRI signal. Each run lasted12
min. To familiarize participants beforehand with the procedure, they
were trained twice using 10 trials, which were not used in the actual
experiment.
Approximately at the same time on the consecutive day (mean inter-
val: 23.5  1.2 h), participants came back and performed two surprise
memory tests. Before the start of these tests, participants were asked
whether they had expected a subsequent memory test while being
scanned the day before. None of them had expected any memory test(s).
Thereafter, the experimenter debriefed the participants by explaining the
rationale of the memory tests.
The first test was included to assess subjective confidence on remem-
bering the gist of a studied scene (i.e., subjective measure of memory
strength). In this task, 150written gist descriptions of studied sceneswere
randomly intermixed with 150 descriptions of scenes that were not stud-
ied before. Participants were asked to judgewhether each descriptionwas
associated with a scene studied before or not (i.e., “Yes” or “No”) and
give a confidence rating on a visual analog scale ranging from 0% to
100% by moving the cursor via a mouse movement to the appropriate
position (Fig. 1). This task was self-paced with a trial duration limited to
a range between 2 and 8 s.
The second memory test was included to assess how much detail the
participants remembered for each scene. Here, the written descriptions
of each studied scene were presented sequentially at the center of the
screen for 1 s. After each description, three true and three false details
related to the same scene were presented randomly intermixed one after
another in the center of the screen. Participants were instructed to judge
whether each detail was either true or false (Fig. 1). The selection of three
true and three false details was randomized separately for each scene and
participant. To reduce the expectancy that 50% of details were correct,
we randomly intermixed descriptions of practice trials, for which either
all six details were true, or all six details were false. The detailmemory test
was divided into three blocks of 50 trials each. The task was self-paced
limited to a presentation time per detail between 2 and 8 s.
Memory performance data analysis. For the memory test for identifica-
tion of one-sentence written gist descriptions, numbers of hits, misses,
false alarms, and correct rejections and hit rate and false alarm rate across
Table 1. An example of written descriptions for the gist and associated true and
fictitious details of a complex scene
Pairs of details
Gist True Fictitious Sig.
A man nearby his glider Man wears black T-shirt Man wears white T-shirt 0.12
Man wears white hat Man wears black hat 0.18
Man with red backpack Man with blue backpack 0.23
Trees at the background Houses at the background 0.13
Cloudy sky Blue sky 0.50
Cabin of glider open Cabin of glider closed 0.11
Sig. stands for the significance of the difference of the likelihood ratings between actual and fictitious details, which
was obtained from a separate pilot study.
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all trials are shown in Table 2. Two different
methods were used to derive a performance
measure: hit rate minus false alarm rate (re-
ferred to as accuracy unless specified other-
wise) and hit rate divided by hit rate plus false
alarm rate (referred to as proportion correct)
(Wixted and Ebbesen, 1991; Wixted et al.,
2010). Note that chance level for accuracy is
zero (range1 to 1), whereas chance level for
proportion correct is 0.5 (range 0–1). Confi-
dence ratings (1–100%) of each participant
were grouped into four bins with increasing
ratings to accommodate variability of their dis-
tribution. These four bins corresponded with
equal lengths on the visual analog scale and
thus reflected each participant’s individual dis-
tribution of confidence ratings. Performance
measures within each of these four different
confidence levels of remembering the gist are
also summarized in Table 2, in which hit rate
and false alarm rate were based on the denom-
inator with hits plus misses or false alarms plus
correct rejections within each of four different
confidence bins. The trial-based confidence
ratings (for hit trials) were used in fMRI data
analyses described below.
We subsequently used the detail memory
test to derive an objective measure of memory
strength. Performance measures for this test
were calculated on a trial-by-trial basis (i.e., for
each true gist description) across the six (three
true, three false) detail items that were probed.
Table 2 summarizes these averaged perfor-
mance data across all participants and across all trials. Additionally, trial-
based detail memory performance measures are presented separately for
the four subjective confidence levels resulting from four levels of confi-
dence of remembering the gist described above. Again, we used two
different scoring methods to calculate trial-based accuracy and propor-
tion correct. The resulting trial-based accuracy and proportion correct
scores were also used in fMRI data analyses.
Memory performance in the twomemory tests was submitted separately
for statistical testing to SPSS 16.0 (SPSS). We calculated one-sample t tests
against chance levels for hit rate and both accuracy measures described
above. In addition, correlations between confidence ratings of remembering
thegist andobjectivedetailmemoryperformancewere initially calculatedon
a trial-by-trial basis for each participant. Individual correlation coefficients
were then Fisher’s z-transformed for further statistical testing.
fMRI data acquisition. Whole-brain T2*-weighted gradient echo EPI
images with blood oxygenation level-dependent contrast were acquired
with a Siemens Trio 3.0 T MR scanner using an ascending slice acquisi-
tion sequence (37 axial slices, TR: 2.18 s; TE: 25 ms; flip angle: 90°; slice
matrix size: 64  64; slice thickness: 3.0 mm; slice gap: 0.3 mm; FOV:
212  212 mm). The study phase was divided into three runs of 336
volumes each. High-resolution structural images (1  1  1 mm) were
acquired using a T1-weighted three-dimensional magnetization-prepared
rapid gradient-echo sequence (TR: 2.3 s; TE: 2.96 ms, flip angle: 8°, FOV:
256 256 192mm).
fMRI data analysis. Image preprocessing and statistical analysis was
performed using SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first five
EPI volumes were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration. Remaining
functional imageswere rigid-bodymotion corrected and themean image
was coregistered to each participant’s T1-weighted MR image. Subse-
quently, images were corrected for slice acquisition timing, transformed
into a common stereotactic space (using the MNI152 T1-template), and
resampled into 2 mm isotropic voxels. Finally, images were spatially
smoothed by convolvingwith an isotropic 3DGaussian kernel (8mm full
width at half maximum). The data were statistically analyzed using gen-
eral linearmodels (GLMs) and statistical parametricmapping (Friston et
al., 1995).
To tackle the question about differential neural correlates of memory
formation associated with either subsequent subjective or objective
measure, we first conducted an event-related parametric analysis with
linearly orthogonalized subjective (confidence ratings inmemory test for
identification of gist descriptions) and objective (trial-based detail mem-
ory accuracy) measures as parametric modulations separately. Linear
orthogonalization was calculated as follows. First, the linear regression
between detail memory accuracy (X1) and subjective confidence of re-
membering the gist (X2) was expressed asX2 aX1 b. The orthogo-
nalized accuracy score (X1o) was subsequently calculated as X1o X1
(a X1 b) and vice versa. Based on the memory test for one-sentence
written gist descriptions of studied scenes, encoding trials were first
sorted into two categories (written gist description remembered and
forgotten). Then, the two conditionsweremodeled as separate regressors
and convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function in
SPM5. Trial-based confidence scores reflecting subjective sense of mem-
ory strength were first standardized and then linearly transformed to
partial out their shared covariance (see behavioral results for correlation
coefficient)with accuracy scores resulting from the objective detailmem-
ory test. Subsequently, these orthogonalized confidence scores were in-
cluded into a first-level GLM as linear parametric modulation
covariates (for the remembered items regressor only) to account for
neural activity specifically related to the subjective sense of memory
strength. Similarly, trial-based detail memory accuracy scores were
standardized and orthogonalized with respect to the confidence ratings,
and then included as parametric modulations in a separate first-level
GLM to account for neural activity uniquely associatedwith the objective
measure of amount of information remembered. Additionally, realign-
ment parameters were included in all models to account for movement-
related variability. Furthermore, we used high-pass filtering with a cutoff
of 1/128 Hz, global intensity normalization, and serial correlations cor-
rection using a first-order autoregressive (AR[1]) model.
Contrast parameter images for scene encoding (vs fixation baseline),
successful memory formation (one-sentence gist description remem-
bered vs forgotten), and parametric modulations corresponding with
subjective and objective measures were generated from within the first-
Figure1. Experimental design. The experiment consisted of a study phase on the first day (day 1) and two subsequentmemory
tests on the consecutive day (day 2). In the study phase, participants were scanned while they incidentally encoded 150 complex
scenes. The studyphasewasdivided into three runswith 50 trials each. Around24h later (day 2), participantswere given a surprise
memory test for written gist descriptions of scenes with subjective confidence ratings on a visual analog scale (i.e., 1–100%)
randomly intermixed with lures. Next, they were given a second memory test assessing how many details were accurately
remembered for each scene (see Materials and Methods for more details).
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level GLMs. Subsequently, those parameter images were submitted to the
second-level group analyses using one-sample t tests that treated partic-
ipants as a random variable. In the whole-brain analysis, results from
these analyses were initially thresholded at p 0.001 (uncorrected), and
then cluster sizes were used for statistical inferences. Unless otherwise
specified, only clusters significant at p  0.05 (corrected for multiple
non-independent comparisons) (Worsley et al., 1996) are reported with
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates of their local
maxima. Given our a priori hypothesis regarding the MTL (hippocam-
pus and parahippocampal cortex) and the ventral lateral prefrontal cor-
tex (PFC), three separate masks were used to define search regions for
small volume corrections. Bilateral hippocampus and bilateral parahip-
pocampal cortex were both anatomically defined as detailed by Qin et al.
(2009). Because functional subregions within the PFC are less clearly
defined anatomically, we created a region of interest (ROI) consisting of
all voxels within an anatomical mask of the ventral lateral PFC as defined
in the Automatic Anatomical Labeling template (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al.,
2002) that activated at the group level in the contrast of all encoding trials
versus low-level baseline. Note that this contrast is orthogonal to the
subjective and objective measures of interest.
Additionally, we performed a complementary analysis using a categor-
ical model that allowed us to confirm and better illustrate activation
patterns in the PFC and the MTL related to subjective and objective
measures, because such patterns cannot be derived from orthogonalized
event-related parametric analyses in a straightforward manner. For this
model, we split each participant’s trials into four categories based on high
versus low scores on the two relevant dimensions (subjective and objec-
tive measures). For the confidence ratings of gist description identifica-
tion, we regrouped the four confidence level bins into two categories of
“lower” (“unsure,” “somewhat sure,” or “sure”) versus “higher” (“very
sure”) confidence (Table 2). Similarly, the trial-based detail memory
accuracy scores (based on hitsminus false alarms) were grouped into two
categories of “lower” (1 to 0) and “higher” (0.33–1) levels (Table 3).
In this first-level categorical GLM, four separate regressors of interest
were included corresponding with lower and higher levels of the subjec-
tive (i.e., confidence on remembering the gist) and the objective (i.e.,
detail memory accuracy) measure only for trials that were later remem-
bered: (1) higher scores for both subjective and objectivemeasures (high-
high); (2) higher scores for the subjective measure but lower scores for
the objective measure (high-low); (3) lower scores for the subjective
measure but higher scores for the objective measure (low-high); (4)
lower scores for both subjective and objective measures (low-low). Re-
maining trials weremodeled as a condition of no interest. Settings for this
GLManalysis were otherwise identical to the parametricGLMsdescribed
above. Parameter estimates associated with each of the four regressors of
interest were extracted from the three aforementioned ROIs (i.e., the
bilateral hippocampus, the bilateral parahippocampal cortex, and the
left ventral lateral PFC) at the individual level using MarsBar
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net) (Brett et al., 2002) and averaged across
voxels within regions. Subsequently, extracted datawere visualized in bar
graphs and submitted to separate 2 (subjective: low vs high) by 2 (objec-
tive: low vs high) repeated-measures ANOVAs for further statistical test-
ing in SPSS.
All parametric fMRI data analyses were performed using trial-based
measures of both accuracy and proportion correct (see above for details).
However, the results were very similar and all data presented in tables and
figures were therefore based on only one of the two methods (accuracy,
i.e., hit rate minus false alarm rate). For the categorical model, both
performance measures yield the same results because the grouping of
trials based on objective detail memory turns out identical.
Results
Memory performance
Descriptive statistics of performance data for the two different
memory tests are listed in Table 2. In addition to averages (and
SEM) across all trials, all performance measures were also calcu-
lated separately within the four separate confidence bins of re-
membering the gist. One-sample t tests showed that overall
accuracy and proportion correct for identifying gist descriptions
across all trials was well above chance level (both t(19)  14.67,
both p 0.001). As can be seen in Table 2, accuracy and propor-
tion correct for identifying gist descriptions improved with in-
creasing levels of confidence.
Overall performance in the detail memory test for each par-
ticipant was calculated as the mean of all trial-based detail mem-
ory accuracy and proportion correct scores (Table 2). When
tested across participants, accuracy and proportion correct on
this test were also well above chance level (both t(19) 4.99, both
Table 2. Averageperformance (mean SEM) for thememory test for identifyinggist descriptions, and corresponding trial-basedandgrandaccuracy in thedetailmemory test,
across all trials andwithin four confidence levels of remembering thegist (N20)
Separated for four levels of confidence of remembering the gist
Across all trials Unsure Somewhat sure Sure Very sure
Memory test of identifying the gist
Hits 98.95 3.01 14.70 1.91 14.10 0.81 10.70 1.14 59.45 4.22
Misses 51.05 3.01 13.30 2.21 12.05 1.38 10.4 1.66 15.30 2.38
FA 29.65 3.87 12.80 1.79 7.80 1.11 4.70 1.02 5.35 1.50
CR 120.35 3.87 19.25 4.38 24.45 3.35 21.95 3.06 53.25 7.65
HR 0.670 0.020 0.555 0.031 0.563 0.032 0.541 0.044 0.803 0.027
FAR 0.197 0.026 0.461 0.539 0.250 0.039 0.187 0.037 0.164 0.054
Accuracy 0.473 0.018 0.086 0.049 0.308 0.039 0.328 0.043 0.599 0.048
PC 0.785 0.019 0.576 0.031 0.716 0.031 0.764 0.033 0.869 0.029
Trial-based detail memory
HR 0.612 0.015 0.489 0.031 0.592 0.029 0.531 0.035 0.625 0.018
FAR 0.434 0.013 0.434 0.025 0.477 0.025 0.463 0.031 0.407 0.017
Accuracy 0.177 0.015 0.055 0.021 0.115 0.025 0.068 0.027 0.229 0.015
PC 0.596 0.007 0.522 0.013 0.563 0.016 0.514 0.027 0.615 0.011
N, Number of participants; FA, false alarm; CR, correct rejection; HR, hit rate; FAR, false alarm rate; accuracy, calculated by HR FAR; PC (proportion correct), calculated by HR divided by HR plus FAR.
Table 3. Number of encoding trials for each of the seven levels of trial-based detail memory accuracy (N 20)
1.0 2/3 1/3 0 1/3 2/3 1.0
Mean (SEM) 0.60 (0.19) 4.65 (0.55) 16.10 (0.75) 27.80 (1.35) 28.15 (1.32) 17.70 (1.15) 3.95 (0.63)
Simulated mean (SEM) 1.55 (0.047) 9.28 (0.28) 23.19 (0.71) 30.92 (0.94) 23.19 (0.71) 9.28 (0.28) 1.55 (0.047)
These data are restricted to trials onwhich the one-sentencewritten gist descriptionwas correctly recognized. Trial-based detail memory accuracywas calculated by hit rateminus false alarm rate. Simulatedmeans (and SEM) represent the
distribution under the null hypothesis of no detail memory. N, Number of participants.
Qin et al. • Subjective Memory Strength and Objective Memory Contents J. Neurosci., June 15, 2011 • 31(24):8920–8927 • 8923
p  0.001). The distribution of trial-based detail memory accu-
racy scores is shown in Table 3.
Next, we investigated the relationship between the subjective
confidence of remembering the gist and the objective detail
memory accuracy (and proportion correct). As can be seen in
Table 2, detail memory accuracy (and proportion correct) only
weakly increased with levels of subjective confidence. To test this
latter relationship more formally, we calculated the correlation
between subjective confidence ratings and detail memory accu-
racy on a trial-by-trial basis for each participant. The averaged
Fisher’s z-transformed correlation was 0.19  0.02 (mean 
SEM; calculated across participants), which was statistically dif-
ferent from zero (t(19)  7.91, p  0.001). Thus, as expected,
subjective and objective measures were correlated signifi-
cantly, but also contained a substantial proportion of non-
shared variance.
Neuroimaging results from parametric models
First, we contrasted all encoding trials with low-level baseline
fixation. This contrast revealed a set of widely distributed regions,
including occipitotemporal areas extending into the MTL, the
bilateral PFC, and other regions (Table 4). Subsequently, by con-
trasting trials that were later remembered with those later forgot-
ten based on recognition of the one-sentence gist descriptions, we
found subsequent memory effects in the bilateral hippocampus
and the left ventral lateral and ventral medial PFC (Table 5).
These effects are in line with previous studies showing medial
temporal and prefrontal involvement in memory formation.
More important for the question at issue, we investigated
which brain regions exhibited activity that was positively corre-
lated with subsequent ratings of subjective confidence for re-
membering the gist. This parametric analysis was restricted to
trials of which the one-sentence gist description was successfully
identified (or remembered), and was performed after partialing
out objective measure (i.e., accuracy scores of detail memory)
using linear orthogonalization. This analysis yielded positive cor-
relations between levels of subjective measure and activity in the
left ventral lateral PFC, and the left posterior superior temporal
gyrus extending into the lateral parietal cortex (at the temporo-
parietal junction) (Table 5, Fig. 2A). Thus, these results indicate
that activation of these regions specifically predicted levels of
subjective sense of memory strength.
Subsequently, we identified brain regions specifically associ-
ated with objective measure of the number of details accurately
retrieved. This analysis was again limited to trials of which the
one-sentence gist description was remembered, but now the ac-
curacy scores of objective measure were orthogonalized with re-
spect to scores of subjective confidence. Clusters of voxels
exhibiting a positive correlation with objective measure were
found in the bilateral parahippocampal cortex, extending into
the hippocampus and the fusiform gyrus, and in the left anterior
hippocampus (Fig. 2B). Additionally, one significant cluster was
found outside of the MTL in the left anterior middle temporal
gyrus (Table 5).
Given a concern that the orthogonalization procedure may
force a dissociation betweenneural processes related to subjective
and objective measurements, we also performed separate event-
related parametric analyses using raw scores of these two mea-
surements (i.e., without partialing out theirmutual correlations).
The differences between these analyses with and without or-
thogonalizationwere negligible.Moreover, we ran the same anal-
yses with proportion correct scores (calculated using the method
of hit rate divided by hit rate plus false alarm rate) as parametric
modulations. These analyses yielded almost identical results and
are therefore not reported in detail.
Neuroimaging results from categorical model
We next extracted parameter estimates from our main regions of
interest in the PFC andMTL to further characterize and illustrate
the distinct patterns of these regions related to subjective confi-
dence of remembering the gist and objective detail memorymea-
sures. Figure 3 shows averaged parameter estimates after trials
were grouped into four categories based on higher versus lower
scores on subjective and objective measures, respectively (i.e.,
high-high, high-low, low-high, or low-low). Further statistical
analysis of these extracted data also revealed that the left ventral
Table 4. Brain activations related to encoding of complex pictures (all trials during
encoding vs fixation)
MNI152 coordinates
Brain regions R/L BA t values x y z
Occipital cortex L 19 18.12*** 32 90 18
R 17/18 20.22*** 4 92 6
18 18.58*** 44 78 8
Fusiform gyrus L 19/37 19.53*** 26 48 6
20 18.77*** 30 44 18
Parahippocampal cortex R 19 21.20*** 28 60 8
20 16.48*** 36 40 18
Hippocampus L — 12.86*** 28 28 12
— 13.25*** 24 20 18
R — 12.99*** 26 24 16
— 13.54*** 24 30 6
Ventral lateral PFC L 45 11.22*** 28 24 2
R 47 10.16*** 30 32 10
Perirhinal cortex L 21 8.81*** 36 10 28
R 21 8.11*** 38 8 28
Midbrain/brainstem L — 8.01*** 2 28 12
R — 7.68*** 2 34 32
Local maxima are defined in MNI152 standard space as implemented in SPM5. ***p 0.05, cluster level of the
whole brain familywise error corrected. Activations in theMTL are in bold type. L, Left; R, right; BA, Brodmann area;
MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute.
Table 5. Brain activations related tomemory formation in parametric analyses
MNI152 coordinates
Brain regions R/L BA t values x y z
Subsequent memory effect: remembered vs forgotten
Posterior fusiform gyrus R 19 5.66*** 40 68 10
Parahippocampal cortex L 36/37 4.61** 38 34 8
Hippocampus L — 4.31** 30 26 10
— 4.50** 16 34 0
R — 4.39** 26 24 14
Ventral lateral PFC L 45 3.86* 40 34 6
Ventral medial PFC L 10 3.99* 8 46 8
Positive correlations with subjective measure (confidence of remembering the gist)
Temporoparietal junction L 39 6.57*** 48 60 22
Posterior ITC R 19 5.75*** 50 68 12
37 5.27*** 48 56 14
Ventral lateral PFC L 47 5.08*** 46 22 2
45 4.52*** 52 24 10
Positive correlation with objective measure (the number of details accurately remembered)
Parahippocampal cortex L 20/37 6.75*** 30 36 14
R 20/36 5.45*** 36 36 14
Angular gyrus L 21 5.75*** 28 76 34
Hippocampus L — 4.08** 22 14 14
Ventral lateral PFC L 45 4.40* 44 36 12
Local maxima are defined in MNI152 standard space as implemented in SPM5. ***p 0.05 at cluster level of the
whole brain corrected; activations in theMTL are in bold; **p 0.05, cluster level of small volume corrected; *p
0.001, uncorrected; ITC, inferior temporal cortex; L, left; R, right; BA, Brodmann area; MNI, Montreal Neurological
Institute.
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lateral PFC exhibited a main effect of subjective confidence of
remembering the gist (F(1,19)  6.72, p  0.018). However, nei-
ther the main effect of objective detail memory nor the interac-
tion of both factors (both F(1,19) 1.90, both p 0.18) reached
significance. In contrast, both the hippocampus and the parahip-
pocampal cortex showed amain effect of objective detailmemory
(both F(1,19)  16.60, both p  0.001), but neither a significant
main effect of subjective confidence of gist memory nor an inter-
action effect (all F(1,19)  1). These results again indicate that
ventral lateral PFC activity predicted subsequent subjective con-
fidence of remembering the gist, whereas hippocampal and para-
hippocampal activity predicted levels of subsequent objective
detail memory measures or the amount of information remem-
bered (Fig. 3A,B).
Discussion
Here, we dissociated neural correlates of successful memory for-
mation related to a subsequent subjective sense of memory
strength from those related to an objective measure of the num-
ber of details accurately remembered. While activation of the left
ventral lateral PFC and the temporoparietal junction predicted
subsequent levels of subjective confidence when remembering
the gist of a past event, parahippocampal and hippocampal activ-
ity predicted the number of details accurately remembered. Sev-
eral recent functional neuroimaging studies using conventional
recognition memory paradigms have addressed neural processes
regulating memory strength, such as strong versus weak memo-
ries (Squire et al., 2007; Kirwan et al., 2008; Shrager et al., 2008)
and memory retrieval associated with high versus low amount
of information recollected (Vilberg and Rugg, 2007, 2009).
Our findings importantly extend these studies by showing that
such neural operations can be subdivided into component
processes that are associated with distinct dimensions of
memory strength.
Behaviorally, it has been long suggested that the subjective
confidence of remembrance and the objective veridicality of a
memory are not always correlated with each other. For instance,
introspective recollection with high subjective confidence occurs
in the absence of veridicality, as exemplified by eyewitness mis-
identification or false memories (Loftus, 1979; Schacter, 2001;
Kensinger, 2008). Such experimental findings and real-life phe-
nomena are consistent with notions that representations of a
memory are compositional and nonunitary (Henke, 2010). One
may therefore argue that the concept of memory strength reflects
a functionally heterogeneous set of phenomena, which can be
dissociated at least along the dimensions of the subjective sense of
(gist) memory strength and the objective amount of information
accurately remembered implemented in our present study.
Figure2. Brain activation related to subsequent subjective (confidence of remembering the
gist) and objective (detail memory accuracy or the amount of information accurately remem-
bered) measures in the parametric models. Statistical parametric maps are overlaid onto a
high-resolution T1 template in MNI152 space (cluster-level p  0.05, corrected). A, Areas
exhibiting a positive correlation with trial-based subjective confidence of remembering the
gist, including the left ventral lateral PFC (marked by a circle; left upper panel) and the left
temporoparietal junction (left lower). B, Areas exhibiting a positive (partial) correlation with
trial-based objective detail memory measures including the left hippocampus (marked by a
circle; right upper panel) and the bilateral parahippocampal cortex (right lower). L, Left; P,
posterior.
Figure 3. Data from the categorical model showing the left ventral lateral PFC and the MTL
activity associated with subjective (confidence of remembering the gist) and objective (detail
memory accuracy or the amount of information accurately remembered)measures.A, Left, The
left ventral lateral prefrontal activity showed a main effect of subjective confidence but not
objective detail memorymeasures. Right, Combination of anatomically defined (coded in light
red) and functionally defined (based on the contrast of overall activation vs fixation baseline;
coded in light gray) ventral lateral PFC overlaid onto a high-resolution T1 template in MNI152
space. B, Left, Anatomically defined bilateral hippocampus (coded in red) and bilateral para-
hippocampal cortex (PHC) (coded in blue) overlaid onto a high-resolution T1 template in
MNI152 space. Right, Hippocampal (top right) as well as parahippocampal (bottom right) ac-
tivity predicted levels of subsequent objective detail memory accuracy regardless of subjective
confidence of remembering the gist. High (Low) represents higher (lower) scores for subjective
confidence and objective detail memory measures. Error bars represent corresponding SEM.
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The distinction between subjective sense of memory strength
and the objective amount of information remembered may re-
flect distinct components of a compositional memory (Schacter
and Addis, 2007; Henke, 2010), such as the gist and correspond-
ing specific details (or objective memory contents). This deviates
from a widely investigated dissociation along the lines of famil-
iarity and recollection (Yonelinas et al., 1999; Yonelinas, 2001;
Eichenbaum et al., 2007). Notably, our design was not based on a
conventional recognition memory paradigm, but on a paradigm
that required explicit recall of both the gist of the studied scenes
and their corresponding details based on written descriptions.
Nevertheless, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that the gist
memory test may contain some familiarity, because participants
could have made their memory judgment based in part on the
sense of familiarity of a mental image constructed from the gist
descriptions. Regardless of this potential contamination, it is eas-
ily conceivable that both subjective and objective measures
implemented here are dominated by recollective processes of im-
agery and scene reconstruction. Thus, our observed distinction
between neural correlates of subjective sense of (gist) memory
strength andobjective amount of information accurately remem-
bered does not readily map onto a framework of familiarity ver-
sus recollection.
As shown by our findings, activity in specific frontal and pa-
rietal regions contributes to memory strength by predicting the
subjective sense of confidence associated with retrieval of the gist
of an episode. These regions have been associated with several
memory- and metamemory-related processes such as semantic
processing, internal monitoring, and allocation of attentional re-
sources (Wagner, 1999; Metcalfe, 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001;
Simons and Spiers, 2003; Cabeza et al., 2008). Such processes are
thought to facilitate the rapid capture of the semantic gist of
complex visual information, or the creation of a proactive sense
for a novel experience (Bar, 2003, 2009). Notably, such higher
semantic processes differ from the establishment of familiarity, in
which the perirhinal cortex is implicated (Diana et al., 2007;
Eichenbaum et al., 2007). By using a conventional recognition
memory paradigm with confidence ratings, a study by Preston et
al. (2010) demonstrates that parahippocampal and hippocampal
activity predicted levels of confidence when recognizing scenes.
We do not think, however, that this finding speaks against our
finding that frontal and temporoparietal activity, but not medial
temporal activity, predicts subjective sense of (gist) memory
strength. The paradigm they used was designed to investigate
whether there are domain-specific or domain-generalmnemonic
processes in parahippocampal and hippocampal regions, rather
than disentangling subjective confidence ratings from the objec-
tive amount of information accurately encoded. Thus, it is well
possible that high levels of confidence for correctly recognized
scenes were driven by encoding of many specific details. In our
present study, however, we developed a novel paradigm to qualify
subjective sense of memory strength, in which participants were
asked to identify one-sentencewritten gist descriptions of studied
scenes in the gist memory test rather than recognizing original
studied stimuli. In this type ofmemory test, remembering the gist
of an episode is thought to be independent of specific details
(Adolphs et al., 2001, 2005). Hence, high levels of confidence for
remembering the gist would mainly reflect a strong subjective
sense of memory strength without being confounded by retriev-
ing specific details. In other words, although remembering the
gist of a past event may lead to a strong subjective sense of re-
membrance, this is not necessarily correlated with verbatim de-
tails. For instance, patients with parietal lesions show reduced
confidence in remembering their previous experiences, whereas
their overall memory performance remains intact (Simons and
Spiers, 2003; Simons et al., 2010). Therefore, a strong subjective
sense of memory strength may be a consequence of frontal–pari-
etal processes involved in top-downmodulation ofmemory- and
metamemory-related processes such as semantic processing, in-
ternal monitoring, and allocation of attentional resources that
contribute to facilitating the reconstruction of visual scenes into
general semantic categories.
The parahippocampal cortex and the hippocampus appear to
formmemories about details and their association with a specific
event (here, a picture of a complex scene), which may be medi-
ated by relational binding mechanisms in the MTL (Davachi,
2006; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Squire et al., 2007). In our study,
memory strengthwas objectivelymeasured by assessing the num-
ber of details that were recalled accurately in a subsequent mem-
ory test. In terms of a recent neurocognitive model, memory
strength can be objectively determined by the number of feature
units that can be successfully reinstated during retrieval (Shima-
mura and Wickens, 2009). To form a strong, objectively defined
memory, neural resources are required that bind disparate details
(or feature units) into a coherent episodic memory. The more
such resources are involved when forming a new episodic mem-
ory, the more feature units of that episode are established, and
thus the more details can be remembered. The hierarchical orga-
nization of the parahippocampal regions and the hippocampus,
inwhich neural processing streams fromdiverse association areas
converge, provides an optimal substrate for such processes to
occur (Squire et al., 2004; Suzuki and Amaral, 2004; Ferna´ndez
and Tendolkar, 2006; Suzuki and Baxter, 2009).
The dissociation along the two distinct dimensions, i.e., sub-
jective confidence based on introspective experience of the gist
and the objective amount of specific details accurately remem-
bered, may contribute to the flexibility of our memory processes.
The frontoparietal contribution, predicting the subjective sense
of memory strength, is likely beneficial for rapidly extracting the
gist of a complex event to support a quick categorical decision or
prediction when it is necessary (Bar, 2003, 2009). The MTL, in
contrast, appears to contribute to building memories about de-
tails so that accurate and vivid retrieval of past events can be
retrieved. It remains open, however, how these two (sets of) pro-
cesses are coordinated when new memories are formed. In some
instances, the optimal balance between themmay be altered. One
may speculate that arousal or acute stress might affect this bal-
ance and result in dissociation between subjective sense of re-
membrance and the objective memory content(s) remembered.
A potent example of this is eyewitness misidentification, where a
high subjective sense of confidence for correct recollection (i.e.,
the gist) occurs in the absence of objective veridicality of specific
memory details (Loftus, 1979; Schacter, 2001; Sharot et al., 2007;
Kensinger, 2008; Phelps and Sharot, 2008; Simons et al., 2010). It
would be relevant for future research to address how the brain
achieves an optimally adaptive balance between these distinct (sets
of) processes when individuals are exposed to an acute stressor.
In sum, this study provides initial evidence for the notion that
memory strength may reflect a functionally heterogeneous set of
phenomena, and can be at least defined along the dimensions of
subjective sense of remembrance and the objective memory con-
tent(s). The subjective sense of memory strength appears estab-
lished by frontal–parietal processing and determines how strong
a memory (i.e., the gist) is perceived at retrieval. The other and
more objective dimension is associated with medial–temporal
processing and determines how accurate specific details or infor-
8926 • J. Neurosci., June 15, 2011 • 31(24):8920–8927 Qin et al. • Subjective Memory Strength and Objective Memory Contents
mation are later remembered within the context of a specific
study episode. This is in line with recent theoretical proposals
that memory representations (or traces) are compositional and
nonunitary. Further research is needed to understand how the
balance between these multiple dimensions is achieved during
memory formation.
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